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INTRODUCTION

On November 10, 1988, President Reagan signed into law Public
Law 100-647, the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988.'
A stated purpose for the enactment of TAMRA was "to make technical
corrections relating to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 2 One such correction that attracted a great deal of attention was the revision of section
7852(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, 3 which addresses the relation*

Attorney-Advisor, United States Tax Court. B.A., 1984, Brandeis University; J.D., 1987,

University of Virginia; LL.M., 1989, University of Florida. Any view expressed herein is the
author's alone and in no way reflects the opinion of the United States Tax Court.
1. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342
(codifed as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 3342 [hereinafter TAMRA].
2. Id. at 3342. See also H.R. REP. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. XVII, reprinted in
1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5060 [hereinafter TAMRA Conference Report].
3. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [hereinafter the Code].
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ship between tax treaty provisions and revenue laws. 4 As amended,
section 7852(d) codifies the application of the "later-in-time rule",, to
overlaps between treaty obligations and revenue laws, stating that if
a conflict arises between a treaty and a tax statute the latter-enacted
law will prevail.6 The revision of section 7852(d) was a curious development because, on a strictly statutory level, it added nothing to the
law: the later-in-time rule should apply to conflicts between treaties
7
and tax statutes regardless of whether it is articulated in the Code.
The reason for the enactment of new section 7852(d) in spite of this
fact, as well as for all the attention it attracted, is the focus of this
enquiry.
This article will thus examine new section 7852(d) of the Code: its
constitutional and judicial bases, statutory predecessors, and policy
implications and ramifications.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Section 1 of Article I of the Constitution grants "all legislative
powers" to Congress. s Section 2 of Article II vests the treaty-making
power in the executive, "by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate."9 This seemingly benign division of labor, part of the Framers'
system of checks and balances, has been a source of controversy
"[firom our constitutional beginnings."'10 Underlying this dispute has
been the fact that the Constitution speaks only in general terms when
it divides the lawmaking powers. It does not clearly distinguish those
areas to be addressed by treaties from those to be addressed by acts

4. I.R.C. § 7852(d) (1988).
5. The later-in-time rule is fully discussed infra at Section III, Part A. It should be noted
that the later-in-time rule is a canon of construction of broad application. It applies not only
when a statute and treaty overlap, but also if two federal statutes or two treaty obligations
conflict. See id.
6. The application of the later-in-time rule to the interaction of treaties and statutes is fully
discussed infra at Section III, Part B. New § 7852(d), in fact, does not explicitly state the
later-in-time rule. Rather, it states that neither a treaty nor a revenue statute shall be accorded
any deference because of its status. I.R.C. § 7852(d)(1) (1988). As the legislative history makes
clear, however, this language was intended to have the effect of codifying the application of the
later-in-time rule to overlaps between treaties and revenue statutes. See infra Section V, Part A.
7. As discussed below, the later-in-time rule is a longstanding rule of statutory interpretation. See infra Section III, Part A. Furthermore, no special rule has ever been articulated
excepting tax treaties from its ambit. See also infra note 12 (tax conventions accorded the
status of "treaties" under the Constitution).
8. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
9. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
10.

L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 140 (1972).
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of Congress." As a result, there is facial overlap between the legislative powers of Congress and the treaty-making powers of the executive. This overlap allows the two branches to address the same areas
with their lawmaking powers, creating the potential for overlapping,
inconsistent stances whenever treaties and statutes address the same
areas. One manifestation of this problem is in the process by which
revenue laws are created: 2 tax treaties negotiated by the Treasury
Department 13 and tax statutes written by Congress often address the
same issues.
The tax legislative process adds a further dimension to the issue
of overlapping treaties and statutes. This is because the Constitution
delegates a special role in tax legislation to the House of Representa-14
tives, designating it the originator of "[a]ll bills for raising revenue.'
By contrast, the House has no official role in the treaty-making process: only the Senate has the power to confirm or reject treaties
negotiated by the executive.15 Thus, the net effect of the constitutional
lawmaking structure supplemented by the later-in-time rule is that
the House is statutorily excluded from the tax treaty process, a process
which can supplant the tax legislation that body is charged with initiating.
A strong argument can be made that this result was unintended
by the Framers. There is no constitutional definition of the term
"treaty," as Professor Henkin states: "the Framers apparently saw
no need to define what was well known to international law and practice.16 However tax treaties were not "well known" in the 1770s. The
first tax agreement postdated the Constitution by at least one hundred
11.

Under art. VI, cl. 2 of the Constitution treaties have the force and effect of law. See

also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (properly ratified treaty must "be regarded in
courts of justice as an equivalent to an act of the legislature"). The power to enter into treaties
is thus properly classified as a "lawmaking power."
12. Tax conventions are accorded the status of "treaties" under the Constitution, and are
thus subject to the same analysis as other treaties. Samann v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 461,
463 (4th Cir. 1963); American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1957).
13. See U.S. CONGRESS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION AND SENATE COMMITrEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TAX TREATIES: STEPS IN THE NEGOTIATION AND RATIFICATION
OF TAX TREATIES AND STATUS OF PROPOSED TAX TREATIES (Joint Comm. Print 1979).
14. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. Although this provision can be seen as having little
practical effect, since a revenue -bill can still be amended by the Senate and also must be
approved by the Senate before becoming law, it nonetheless evidences an intent on the part of
the Framers to insure a significant role for the popularly elected House in the tax. legislative
process.
15. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In fact, the alliance of the executive and Senate for the
purpose of making treaties has been described as a "fourth branch" of the government. L.
HENKIN, supra note 10, at 130.
16. L. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 140.
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years. 17 The first U.S. tax treaty was not entered into until 1932.18
Neither was a federal income tax "well known" to the Framers. The
first attempt to impose an income tax in the U.S. was not made until
1894.19 Nonetheless, barring amendment, 2° it is within this constitutional scheme that tax treaties and revenue acts must interact and be
reconciled. As a result, judicial doctrines have been developed and
acts of Congress have been passed to provide means of reconciling
overlapping treaty and statutory provisions.
III.
A.

JUDICIAL DOCTRINES

The Later-in-Time Rule

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstand21
ing.
17.

See Rosenbloom & Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy, An Overview, 19 COLUM.

J. TRANSNATL L. 359, 361 (1981) (discussing the genesis of international agreements to avoid
double taxation).
18. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Apr. 27,
1932, United States-France, 49 Stat. 755, reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED
STATES

TAx

CONVENTIONS, ROBERTS & HOLLAND COLLECTION

10 [hereinafter U.S.-France

Treaty].
19. An Act to Reduce Taxation, to Provide Revenue for the Government and for Other
Purposes, 28 Stat. 509 (1894). This first attempt to impose an income tax was held to be
unconstitutional under the rule of apportionment, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl.4. Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 607-608, on remand 158 U.S. 601 (1895). This fact
further supports the proposition that the Framers did not contemplate a federal income tax.
20. Under Article V of the Constitution, amendments to the Constitution can be proposed
by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress or at a constitutional convention called by the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. Proposed amendments require the assent of three-fourths
of the states to be approved. U.S. Const. art. V. There have been recent movements to convene
such a convention, such as occurred in the period preceding the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
addressing the federal budget deficit, when a balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution
was considered. See Goldberg, The Proposed Constitutional Convention, 11 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1 (1983). Such a convention, or an amendment proposed by Congress, could address the
problem of overlapping treaties and federal statues. However, as Chief Justice Marshall said,
the process for amending the Constitution is"unwieldy and cumbrous." E. CORWIN, THE
CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 146 (1948). As a result, a constitutional solution
to the problem of overlapping treaties and statutes is not likely to occur, leaving a legislative
solution, as finally occurred concerning the budget deficit, the much more practicable approach.
21. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Treaties and acts of Congress are thus, by the terms of the Constitution, preeminent over any previous or subsequent conflicting state
law. 2
The interaction of federal statutes and treaties, both between themselves and with each other, is not so clear. The Supremacy Clause
labels both these types of laws "the supreme law of the land," but
nowhere does the Constitution distinguish between them or provide
a mechanism to enable certain statutes or treaties to prevail over
other, conflicting ones. 23 Lacking a constitutional means of resolving
these conflicts, the Supreme Court has developed the later-in-time
doctrine to address these situations, based on the concept of supersession. Under the later-in-time rule, conflicts between these legal equivalents are resolved in favor of the more recently enacted law." Of
course, such overrides are not mandatory. Congress can vary the
application of the later-in-time rule by explicit provision. 5
B.

The Interaction of Treaties and Statutes

As applied to conflicts between treaties and statutes, the later-intime rule provides that a treaty may supplant an earlier statute, 26 and

22.

See L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

226 (2d ed. 1988) (treaty overrides

previous or subsequent conflicting state law); id. at 479 (federal statute overrides previous or
subsequent conflicting state law).
An exception to the Supremacy Clause's general rule that federal laws are preeminent over
state statutes is contained in the Tenth Amendment, which states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X. The scope of this limit on
the federal power to legislate is unclear. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976) (invalidating the extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to apply to state
and municipal employees); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(overruling National League of Cities). See also L. TRIBE, supra at 378-97.
23. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 226 (characterizing the Supreme Court's treatment
of federal statutes and treaty obligations as "legal equivalents"). Although the Constitution does
not make either treaties or statutes superior to the other, it has been argued that it is not a
necessary deduction that they should be treated as equal. L. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 163
("[a]s an original matter, the equality as law of treaties and statutes seems hardly inevitable;
surely, there is no basis for it in the Supremacy Clause ...").
24. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1956). The universal application of the later-intime rule has been criticized as poor public policy. See, e.g., Townsend, CongressionalAbrogation
of Indian Treaties: Reevaluation and Reform, 98 YALE L.J. 793 (1989) (arguing that congressional legislative overrides of Indian treaty obligations should be upheld only if they contain an
express statement of override and "a justification acceptable for terminating treaties under
international law." Id. at 810).
25. See, e.g., § 1012(aa)(3) of TAMRA, supra note 1, at 3531-32 (listing certain treaty
obligations not overruled by that act).
26. L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 226.
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a later-enacted statute may replace a treaty. 27 Prerequisite to the
application of the later-in-time rule, however, is the presence of a
conflict between a treaty and statute.2 Whether such a conflict exists,
absent an explicit reference in the later law or elsewhere by its drafters, is a question of statutory interpretation. Courts have endeavored
not to find such conflicts, preferring to construe the two laws harmoniously, if at all possible. 29 As a result, a specifically articulated intent
to supersede is generally necessary for a subsequent law to be construed as contravening an existing treaty or statute.- This fact, in
combination with another doctrine of construction which provides that
"general provisions of law must yield to more specific ones" makes it
especially difficult for a statute to override a treaty without a stated
intention to do so, since treaties are generally more specific than
statutes.31 As one commentator observed: "Mere inconsistency, without more, between a later-enacted domestic statutory provision and
a prior treaty is not sufficient to override the treaty."- Perhaps in
part for this reason, there has been a significant amount of legislation
addressing the interaction of tax treaties and revenue acts.

IV.
A.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1936-1951: Deferral to Tax Treaties

As stated above, the United States entered into its first tax treaty
in 1932. 3 Article X of that treaty stated that the obligations of both
parties "shall remain effective for a period of five years, and thereafter

27. A later-enacted statute will effectively replace a treaty for domestic law purposes. Id.
at 226; however, the United States' international obligation will remain. See infra note 157.
28. L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 226.
29. As the Supreme Court stated: "[w]hen a [treaty and statute are] related to the same
subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that
can be done without violating the language of either .
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194 (1888).
30. Although this statement is an accurate reflection of past case law, its intrinsic veracity
has been a matter of recent dispute, and was ultimately rejected by the Senate TAMRA report.
Regarding past case law, see, e.g., Cook v. United States 288 U.S. 102 (1933), wherein the
Court stated: "[a] treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later
statute, unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed." Id. at 120;
see also United States v. Lee Yen Ta, 185 U.S. 213 (1902). For rejection by Senate TAMRA
report, see infra Section V, Part A.
31. Rosenbloom, Current Developments in Regard to Tax Treaties, 40 INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 31-1, 31-12 (1982).

32. Doernberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties: The Branch Profits Tax and
Congressional Arrogation of Authority, 42 TAX LAW. 173, 200 (1989).
33. U.S.-France Treaty, supra note 18.
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until twelve months from the date on which either Contracting Party
gives notice of its termination. '" In light of the later-in-time rule, a
potential for conflict immediately existed. On the one hand, the United
States had just entered into a binding international obligation that
contained a very explicit, exclusive means for termination, invocable
only after five years. On the other hand, under the later-in-time rule,
an inconsistent act of Congress could terminate U.S. adherence to the
treaty at any time.
This situation was at least partially addressed by the Revenue Act
of 1936.3 That act codified the first explicit coordination between
treaty obligations and the Code. Section 22(b)(7) excluded from the
definition of gross income "[i]ncome of any kind, to the extent required
by any treaty obligation of the United States." 6
The legislative history of the 1936 Act does not articulate the
motivations behind the enactment of section 22(b)(7).37 However, as
one author points outs, the Revenue Bill of 1936 both coincided with
and engendered developments which required the first real consideration by Congress of the role of tax treaties in U.S. policy.- While
the 1936 Act was being formulated, the 1932 tax treaty with France
was going into effect. 39 Additionally, that act significantly revised the
way the United States taxed nonresident aliens and foreign corporations: replacing the undistributed profits tax on foreign corporations
with foreign shareholders with a ten percent flat rate tax on the U.S.
source income of nonresident aliens not engaged in a trade or business
in the U.S., and imposing a flat rate tax on the U.S. source income

34. Id. at 15. The current U.S. model treaty contains a closely analogous article, providing
that: "[e]ither Contracting State may terminate the convention at any time after 5 years from
the date on which the convention enters into force, provided that at least 6 months prior notice
of termination has been given through diplomatic channels." United States Dept. of Treasury
Model Income Tax Treaty, art. 29, June 16, 1981, reprinted in Tax Treaties (CCH) $ 158
[hereinafter U.S. Model Treaty].
35. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, reprintedin 78 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS
OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950. LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DOCUMENTS (1979) [hereinafter 1936 Act].
36. Id. at § 22(b)(7). This provision was recodified at § 894(a) by the 1954 Act. S. REP.
No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 418 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4621.
37. Brecher, Relationshipof, and Conflicts Between Income Tax Treaties and the Internal
Revenue Code, 24 TAX EXECUTIVE 175, 185 (1972).
38. Id. at 185-86.
39. Although signed in 1932, the exchange of ratifications did not occur until 1935, and the
treaty did not go into effect until Jan. 1, 1936. 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
TAX CONVENTIONS, ROBERTS & HOLLAND COLLECTION 19. See also Brecher, supra note
37, at 186.
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of foreign corporations as well.40 It can thus be postulated that the
enactment of section 22(b)(7) was an action in deference to, and in
support of, the tax treaty with France,'41 as well as an invitation to
other countries to negotiate similar compacts in light of the newly
42
increased taxation of nonresident aliens and foreign corporations.
The ambit of section 22(b)(7) was, however, limited, since it only
dealt with exclusions from gross income required by treaty provisions,
remaining silent as to other potential overlaps, such as in the areas
of deductions and credits.- This omission was first addressed by the
broad language of section 8 of title I of the Revenue Act of 1940,
which stated that "[n]o amendment made by this title shall apply in
any case where its application would be contrary to any treaty obligaacts, between
tion of the United States. "- Several subsequent revenue
5
the years of 1941-1951, contained similar provisions.4
B.

1954-1966: Incipient Activism

The explicit deferral to tax treaties found in earlier revenue acts
became part of the Code-in 1954, as section 7852(d). 46 Like its predecessors which addressed changes wrought by particular statutes, section
7852(d) stated that no Code provision would apply to the extent it
contravened a United States treaty obligation. 47 This broad-ranging
statement was seen as necessary to make clear that the repeal and

40. 1936 Act, supranote 35, §§ 211, 231; H. Rep. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1939).
41. But for the inclusion of § 22(b)(7)'in the Revenue Act of 1936 it could have been argued
that the act superseded at least one provision of the U.S.-France treaty under the later-in time
rule. Under that treaty foreign "enterprises" were "not subject to taxation by the other contracting State in respect of their industrialand commercial profits except in respect of such profits
allocable to their permanent establishments in the latter State." U.S.-France Treaty, supra
note 18, at art. 1, 11-12. In contrast, the 1936 Act imposed a 15 percent tax on, among other
things, U.S. source "profits" of "every foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business
within the United States and not having an office or place of business therein." 1936 Act, supra
note 35, at § 231(a). Thus a French corporation not engaged in a trade or business in the U.S.
might have had to pay tax on its U.S. source profits, despite the provision in the newly ratified
treaty to the contrary.
42. Brecher, supra note 37, at 186.
43. Id. at 186-87.
44. Revenue Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-656, Title 1 § 8, 54 Stat. 516, 520 (1941), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS, supra note 39.
45. Brecher, supra note 37, at 187 n.53.
46. I.R.C. § 7852(d) (1954).
47. As enacted, § 7852(d) stated: "(d) Treaty Obligations. No provision of this title shall
apply in any case where its application would be contrary to any treaty obligation of the United
States in effect on the date of enactment of this title." I.R.C. § 7852(d) (1954).
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new enactment of the Code which occurred in 1954- did not wholly
supplant existing United States treaty obligations under the later-intime rule. 49 The language of section 7852(d) was, however, carefully
circumscribed, stating that it only applied to treaty obligations in
effect as of the date of the enactment of the 1954 Code.The addition of this qualification was a significant development.
Like section 22(b)(7) of the 1939 Code, section 7852(d) evidenced a
respect for, and deference to, treaty obligations. However, unlike
section 22(b)(7), section 7852(d) imposed a limit upon that deference,
as Congress was unwilling to commit to not overriding treaties in the
future. This retrenchment by Congress of its previously unqualified
deferral to tax treaties was the first step in a pattern of increased
legislative activism which was to follow. 51
This activism emerged in the Revenue Act of 1962.52 That act added
provisions to the Code taxing U.S. shareholders on the undistributed
dividends of controlled foreign corporations, and taxing domestic corporations on any claimed section 902 "taxes deemed paid credit" as if
that amount was a dividend received. 53 At the time the act was being
formulated it was unclear how these two provisions would interrelate
with U.S. treaty obligations. This uncertainty was addressed in a
statement by the Secretary of the Treasury, sent to Congress along
with the President's tax proposals, which declared that the proposals

48. See I.R.C. § 7851(a) (1954) (making clear that the 1954 Act generally repealed the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and providing effective dates for that repeal).
49. H.R. REP. No. 795, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 75 Stand. Fed. Tax
Rep. Extra Edition (CCH) 4133 (Nov. 5, 1988) [hereinafter House TAMRA Report].
50. I.R.C. § 7852(d) (1954).
51. It is interesting to note that this qualification was added to the 1954 Act by the Senate,
not the House. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 627-28 (1954). This is in contrast to the pattern
developed in later acts, in which it is the House, not the Senate, which is generally the chamber
advocating the more aggressive position with regard to overriding treaty obligations. See discussion of 1962 Act, infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text; discussion of TAMRA and its
predecessor proposed technical correction acts to the 1986 Act, infranotes 116-42 and accompanying text. This variance of positions on treaty overrides may be attributable to the chambers'
differing roles in the treaty-making and tax legislative processes. See supra notes 14-15 and
accompanying text.
52. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS
BEGINNING 1961, at 71 (1966) [hereinafter 1962 Act].
53. Id. §§ 9, 12 adding §§ 951-964 (Controlled Foreign Corporations) and § 78 (Dividends
Received from Certain Foreign Corporations by Domestic Corporations Choosing Foreign Tax
Credit) to the Code. These additions, as well as their interplay with U.S. treaty obligations
existing at the time of their enactment, are fully discussed in Beemer, Revenue Act of 1962
and United States Treaty Obligations, 20 TAx L. REV. 125 (1964).
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contained no conflicts with existing treaty provisions.- Despite this
assurance, the House nonetheless supplemented the proposals with
the following statement, eventually to become section 31 of the Revenue Act of 1962: "Section 7852(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 (relating to treaty obligations) shall not apply in respect of any
amendment made by this Act."- The House was declaring that the
later-in-time rule should be applied to conflicts between the act and
treaties without any statutory mollification. As the accompanying
House report made clear: "if any provision of this bill should contravene
any existing treaty, the new statutory law is intended to have precedence over the prior treaty obligation."5
Reactions to the House's inclusion of this provision were both quick
and voluminous, as the bill moved to the Senate for consideration.
Private interests were concerned that U.S. business opportunities
abroad would be damaged by retaliatory measures from treaty
partners. 57 American credibility was also at stake, it was argued, as
the provision was in contravention of the stated U.S. policy in favor
of adherence to international obligations.- Both the Treasury Secretary and the State Department submitted statements to the Senate
Finance Committee opposing the House's proposal. 59 By the time the
bill went to conference, the provision had been removed.- °
Despite this removal, and despite its strong opposition, both by
representatives of the general public and members of various branches
of the government, the conference agreement reinstated section 31 as
part of the 1962 Act.6 1 As the conference report states: "The Senate
recedes. In this connection, the Treasury Department informed the
Committee of Conference that it is its view that there are no conflicts
between provisions of the bill and provisions of tax treaties, with one
minor exception which the Treasury will seek to have renegotiated. "6

54. Beemer, supra note 53, at 128. This assertion was supported by the fact that these
proposals revised the U.S. taxation of its own residents, an area generally unaffected by tax
treaty obligations. See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 34, art. 1, 3 (the "savings clause,"
which provides that each contracting state reserves the right to tax its citizens and residents
as if the treaty were not in effect).
55. 1962 Act, supra note 52, § 31, 176.
56. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 96, -reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS.
57. Beemer, supra note 53, at 125-26.
58. Id. at 126.
59. Id. at 129-30.
60. Id. at 130.
61. 1962 Act, supra note 52, § 31,
176.
62. H.R. REP. No. 2505, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS.
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The conference report does not explain the rationale for the decision
to reinclude section 31 in the Revenue Act of 1962, other than the
Treasury Department's prognosis that no unaddressed conflicts would
arise between the act and existing treaties. Despite this attempted
minimization of the impact of section 31, it was clearly an important
development, marking the "fundamental change in the relation of tax
treaties to internal tax legislation '' which had been foreshadowed by
the qualifying language contained in section 7852(d) of the 1952 Act.
The "long established Congressional policy not to override by a subsequent tax law existing treaty obligations"' had come to an end.
Treaty obligations were no longer considered sacrosanct when new
tax legislation was being drafted. A balance now would have to be
struck between consideration of international obligations and domestic
concerns, as treaty obligations would remain an important, but no
longer the sole factor determining the interaction of new tax laws
with treaties, as Congress would have to address this issue time and
again in the future.
The Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 once again brought this
issue to light, as it made changes to the U.S. taxation of nonresident
aliens and foreign corporations.6 Unlike the 1962 Act, however, the
1966 Act was quite deferential to U.S. treaty obligations, both in the
changes it made to the Code and in its statement of how these changes
would interact with treaty provisions.6 Most significantly, the act
added section 894(b) to the Code, which created potential tax savings
for nonresident aliens and foreign corporations resident of U.S. tax
treaty partner countries. It did this by making available to them
certain tax exemptions and reductions with regard to income not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United
States, even if those taxpayers otherwise had a permanent establishment in the United States and thus were not entitled to those benefits

63. Beemer, supra note 53, at 127.
64. Id. at 129, quoting Carroll, Income Tax Conventions as an Aid to InternationalTrade
and Investment, INT'L & CoMP. L. BULL. (ABA) 16, 25 (July 1962).
65. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809 §§ 102-110, reprinted in Internal
Revenue Acts 1966-1970, at 92-124 (1971) [hereinafter FITA].
66. One possible reason for Congress' change of approach to U.S. treaty obligations from
the 1962 Act to the 1966 Act may be found in the subject matter of the acts themselves. The
foreign tax sections of the 1962 Act focused upon the taxation of U.S. residents' foreign source
income and, as a result, it was unlikely that the act contravened any U.S. treaty obligations.
See supra note 54. By contrast, the 1966 Act focused upon the taxation of non-U.S. residents,
a matter squarely addressed by U.S. tax treaties. Thus, the possibility of that act overriding
a treaty obligation was more real than in the case of the 1962 Act.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

11

JOURNAL
INTERNATIONAL
Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol.LAW
5, Iss.
1 [1989], Art. 1

[Vol. 5

under the terms of the treaties in force.67 This addition to the Code
coincided with Congress' replacement of the "force of attraction" principle, which had taxed all of a foreign taxpayer's U.S. source income
at regular rates if that taxpayer was engaged in a trade or business
in the United States, with a bifurcated system in which only income
"effectively connected" with that trade or business was to be taxed
at regular rates, and other, unrelated income was to be taxed at a
flat rate. 68 The addition of section 894(b), in combination with this
bifurcation, effectively removed the force of attraction principle from
tax treaties as well, extending the reach of the newly created tax
benefits related to foreign taxpayers' non-effectively connected income.
The Foreign Investors Tax Act thus created increased tax savings
opportunities for residents of U.S. tax treaty partners. As a result,
no conflicts with tax treaty provisions were anticipated.69 Nonetheless,
the act included a statement that, if it did contain any conflicts with
pre-existing treaty obligations, those obligations would prevail. As
section 110 articulated:
No amendment made by this title shall apply in any case
where its application would be contrary to any treaty obligation of the United States. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, the extension of a benefit provided by any amendment made by this title shall not be deemed to be contrary
to a treaty obligation of the United States.70
This deferential approach, reminiscent of pre-1954 statements, raised
the possibility that the activism of the 1962 Act was merely an aberration. However, as statutory developments later proved, this was
not the case.
C.

1976-1986: Variable Approaches

Following the 1966 Act, the issue of the interplay of tax treaties
and revenue laws was dormant until the Tax Reform Act of 1976.71

67. I.R.C. § 894(b) (1988) (added by FITA, supra, note 65, § 105(a),
Brecher, supra note 37, at 189.
68. FITA, supra note 65, §§ 103-104, 97-112.
69.

113), discussed in

Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Description of the Technical Corrections Act of 1988

(H.R. 4333 & S. 2238) (JCS-10 88) 320 (Mar. 31, 1988) [hereinafter TCA 1988 Blue Book].
70. FITA, supra note 65, § 110, 124.
71. Section 309 of the Revenue Act of 1971 did make a technical correction to § 7422(f)(1)
of the Code to insure that that section, which had been added by the Revenue Act of 1966 to
provide that no civil actions for tax refunds could be maintained against employees of the United
States, could not be construed to deny the right to refund claims arising out of treaty provisions.
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That act changed the foreign tax credit provisions of the Code in order
to fill a loophole which was allowing taxpayers to abusively claim
double tax benefits. 72 Specifically, it repealed the per-country limitation, 73 that had prevented the netting of a taxpayer's overall foreign
74
gains and losses in calculating his allowable foreign tax credit. In
addition, it provided for a recapture of previously deducted foreign
losses when a taxpayer subsequently claimed a foreign tax credit in
a later year. 75 With regard to the provisions' interaction with tax
treaties, both the House and the Senate reports stated that it was
their "intention that all existing treaties . . . be applied consistently
with this amendment by using the overall limitation (not the per-country limit) in computing the allowable foreign tax credit."7 6 Although
no conflicts with treaty obligations were anticipated,77 Congress had
"specifically indicated" that it intended its per-country limitation to
supersede any conflicting treaty provisions which might later be discovered.78
A similar approach was adopted in the Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act of 1980, which imposed a seventy percent tax on profits
resulting from the deregulation of the price of oil.- 9 As the conference
report made clear, Congress did not want any person to be exempted
from this tax unless the act itself so specified.80 Although the confer-

Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 309, 85 Stat. 497 (1971), reprinted in INTERNAL
REVENUE ACTS 1971-1975, at 54 (1976); S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted
in INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS 1971-1975, at 626 (1976).
72. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1031(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1620-22 (1976)
[hereinafter 1976 Act].
73. Id. The per-country limitation had been located at § 904(a)(1) of the Code. I.R.C. §
904(a)(1) (1975).
74. As a result, a double benefit would inure to the taxpayers when they subsequently had
gain in the loss country, by their ability to carry forward and deduct that loss (which had
already reduced their U.S. tax liability) in that country. S. REP. No. 938-Part 1, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 236 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Senate Report].
75. 1976 Act, supra note 72. Like the repeal of the per-country limitation, this recapture
precludes taxpayers from reaping a double tax benefit from losses sustained abroad, by preventing them from being able to deduct these losses both abroad and on their U.S. return. 1976
Senate Report, supra note 74, at 239.
76. 1976 Senate Report, supra note 74, at 236-37; H.R. Rep. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 226 (1975).
77. Id.
78. TCA 1988 Blue Book, supra note 69, at 320.
79. See Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223 [hereinafter Crude
Oil Tax Act], reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (94 Stat.) 229; H.R. REP.
No. 96-304, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS. 413.
80. Crude Oil Tax Act, supra note 79, at 659.
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ence committee opined that no existing treaty obligation granted such
an exemption,sl its report went on to declare that "in the event that
the legislation does conflict with any treaty obligations of the United
' 2
States, the conferees intend that the legislation prevail. "
Later that year, as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1980, s3 Congress enacted the Foreign Investment in Real Property
Tax Act.84 As opposed to the previous two acts which had addressed
the area of foreign tax, in which no conflicts with treaty provisions
were anticipated, FIRPTA unequivocally contravened existing treaty
obligations.A The act added section 897 to the Code, which taxes
nonresident aliens and foreign corporations on their gains from dispositions of "United States real property interests" as if that income
were derived from the conduct of a trade or business in the United
States. 8" As a result, gain which otherwise would have eluded U.S.
taxation was henceforth to be taxed s7 This expansion of the ambit of
the Code clearly conflicted with treaty obligations granting favorable
treatment to capital gains 58 In addressing these provisions, Congress
faced a difficult decision. As one author articulates: "Congress clearly
was caught between Scylla and Charybdis. Honoring the treaties would
have made FIRPTA a paper tiger. Overriding the treaties would
violate the fundamental premises undergirding such agreements."The solution which Congress adopted was to override treaty obligations, but to do so slowly. Treaty provisions would be honored for a
five-year period, and thereafter FIRPTA would take precedence. 9°
This "grace period," as the conference report called it,91 tempered the

81.

Id.

82.
83.

Id.
See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (94 Stat.) 2599.
84. See id. §§ 1121-25 [hereinafter FIRPTA].
85. Kaplan, Creeping Xenophobia and the Taxation of Foreign-OwnedReal Estate, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1091, 1110 (1983).
86. See I.R.C. § 897 (1988) (enacted by FIRPTA, supra note 84).

87. Kaplan, supra note 85, at 1110.
88. Id. As Kaplan points out, many tax treaty provisions exempting capital gains from
U.S. taxation did not cover real estate gains. They did, however, protect stock of real estate
holding companies, which FIRPTA included in the definition of "United States real property
interests." See I.R.C. § 897(c) (1988). It was with regard to the disposition of this type of stock
that FIRPTA clearly conflicted with the capital gain treaty provisions. Kaplan, supra note 85,
at 1110.
89. Kaplan, supra note 85, at 1112.
90. FIRPTA, supra note 84, at § 1125(c)(1).
91. H.R. REP. No. 97-215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 280, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 105, 369.
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immediate effect of the treaty override provision, but made it clear
that section 897 would ultimately prevail over conflicting treaties. 92
The Deficit Reduction Act of 198493 adopted yet another approach.
It identified two specific conflicts with treaty provisions, with regard
to the residence of individuals and stapled stock, and stated that treaty
obligations in these areas would prevail. 9 However, with regard to
any other, unidentified conflicts, Congress once again provided that
its statute would be prevalent95
The Tax Reform Act of 19869 brought with it a redesignation of
the Code, 97 and significant changes to its substantive provisions. Despite its broad changes to the Code, the 1986 Act contained no section
7852(d)-like general statement as to how its revisions would interact
with overlapping treaty provisions.9 The House report did, however,
state:
Except as mentioned in the bill or this report, the committee
is not aware of conflicts between any treaty and the changes
(from the 1954 Code as amended) that this bill makes. The
committee intends that this bill be interpreted so as not to
conflict with the policy embodied in treaties where possible
so that the policy goals of both treaties and this bill can be
carried out. The committee expects that such harmonious

92. The grace period did at least create the opportunity for bilateral renegotiation of treaty
provisions prior to the override provision's effective date. See, e.g., Convention Between the
United States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Sept. 26,
1980, United States-Canada, art. XIII(9), Tax Treaties (CCH) 1313 (Sept. 26, 1980), amended
by Protocol of June 14, 1983, art. VI(3), id. 1317 (granting a limited, but permanent exemption to FIRPTA by providing that capital assets held by beneficiaries of the treaty as of
Sept. 26, 1980, could only be taxed to the extent of the assets' appreciation after Dec. 31, 1984).
93. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, (98 Stat.) 494, reprintedin 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS

697.

94.

See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 917 (1985), reprinted in TAX MANAGEMENT, INC. (BNA), THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 (LEGISLATIVE HISTORY) 1 (1986); S.
REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 935 (1986), reprinted in Tax Mgmt. (BNA), THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986 (LEGISLATIVE HISTORY) 333 (1986).
95.

Id.

96.

Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
(100 Stat.) 2085 [hereinafter 1986 Act].
97. Id. § 2(a).
98. It should be noted that although the 1986 Act redesignated the Code, it was not a
repeal and new enactment of the Internal Revenue Title as occurred in 1954. See supra note
48 and accompanying text. As a result, the 1986 Act did not bring with it the same possibility
as accompanied the 1954 Act that U.S. treaty obligations would be wholly supplanted by a
"new," later-in-time Code. Of course, individual changes' interaction with existing treaty obligations still had to be addressed.
ADMIN. NEWS
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interpretations will be the rule rather than the exception.
In any event, the committee is making substantive modifications to present law with clear policies in mind, and does
not intend those policies to be defeated by literal interpretations of existing treaties. 99
Apart from this cryptic inclusion in its legislative history, and a
statement that the priority created by section 7852(d) with regard to
treaty provisions and revenue laws existing at the time of the enactment of the 1954 Code would be preserved,- °° the 1986 Act and its
legislative history addressed treaty overlaps only in the context of its
specific provisions. A comprehensive discussion of all of these intersections is beyond the scope of this article; °1 however, some examples,
as discussed, are illustrative of the variable solutions to this problem
chosen by Congress.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 adopted a panoply of approaches to
treaty overlaps, ranging from outright legislative override, to partial
override, to delegation of the issue to the Treasury, to apparent ignorance of their existence. Revising the source rules of the Code, the
act added section 865, which states that the source of income derived
from the sale of personal property generally shall be the country of
residence of the taxpayer. 1° All of the ramifications of this addition
to the Code were not discussed clearly by Congress.103 However, as
far as its effect on the calculation of the foreign .tax credit, the legislative history makes clear that a treaty override was intended:
The committee is aware that some of the source rules in the
bill may conflict with source rules prescribed in U.S. income
tax treaties. The committee does not intend that treaty
source rules should apply in a manner which would frustrate
the policy underlying the source rules in the bill that untaxed
income should not increase a U.S. taxpayer's foreign tax
credit limitation.'14

99. H.R. REP. No. 99-426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 79, supra note 94.
100. Id.
101. A complete discussion of the changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the area
of foreign tax, and those changes' interaction with U.S. treaty obligations, is contained in Forry
& Karlin, 1986 Act: Overrides, Conflicts and Interactions with U.S. Income Tax Treaties, 35
TAX NOTES 793 (May 25, 1987).
102. 1986 Act, supra note 96, § 1211(a).
103. Forry & Karlin, supra note 101, at 795.
104. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 331, supra note 94. The House report has
similar language. See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 363, supra note 94.
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Of course, this revision of the source rules did conflict with treaty
obligations. U.S. guarantees that a foreign tax credit would be provided to U.S. taxpayers deriving income in treaty-partner countries
were directly affected, as the revised source rules changed the calcu10 5
lation of that credit.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also inaugurated the branch profits
tax of section 884 of the Code, 1°6 which effectively taxes foreign corporations with branches operating in the United States as if those
branches were operated as subsidiaries, paying their foreign parents
dividends annually. In this case, Congress adopted a "partial override"
stance, providing that tax treaty exemptions from the branch profits
tax would be honored only for foreign corporations which passed an
equity ownership look-through rule. The equity ownership lookthrough rule insured that favorable treaty provisions would not be
taken advantage of by residents of foreign countries other than those
of the treaty partner involved.'° This "anti-treaty shopping" provision
thus overrode U.S. treaty obligations,08 and then regranted them, in
those situations which Congress deemed deserving.
Another area addressed by the 1986 Act was the allocation of
research expenses incurred in the U.S. to foreign source income from
related products. The applicable treasury regulation, that had required
part of these expenses to be applied against foreign source income,
had been suspended in 1981.'0 9 Since that suspension, taxpayers had
been applying all of these expenses against U.S. source income. 110 The
act provided, pending the reissuance of regulations in this area, that
fifty percent of these costs should be allocated to U.S. source income,
with the remainder to be divided on the basis of gross sales or gross
income."' The act did not, however, address this area's ultimate interaction with tax treaties. That task was delegated to the Treasury,
as the conference report states:
P

105. See Forry & Karlin, supra note 101, at 795-96.
106. 1986 Act, supra note 96, § 1241(a), $ 2576-79.
107. See t.R.C. § 884(e) (1988).
108. Vettel, Branch Level Tax and Treaty Overrides, 35 TAx NOTES 632, 633 (May 18,
1987).
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8, reprinted in 2 FED. TAx REG. 979 (1981); H.R. REP. No.
99-841, vol. 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-608 (1986), reprinted in Tax Mgmt. (BNA), TAx REFORM
ACT OF 1986 (LEGISLATIVE HISTORY) (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Act Conference Report].
110. 1986 Act Conference Report, supra note 109, at 11-608.
111. See 1986 Act, supra note 96, § 1216(a).
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It is anticipated that the Treasury Department will expeditiously pursue a permanent resolution of the allocation issue.
Moreover, the conferees expect that the Treasury Department, in connection with the U.S. treaty process, will resolve
any incompatibility with foreign tax systems that may arise
if the regulations were to go into effect.112
Other overlaps with treaty obligations were left wholly unaddressed. For example, the act supplemented section 904(d) of the Code,
adding additional, direct limits to the foreign tax credit, by requiring
separate limitations for certain types of income. 113 As discussed, such
confinements of the foreign tax credit conflicted with U.S. treaty
obligations to continually provide the credit with regard to income of
U.S. taxpayers in treaty-partner countries. 114 Nonetheless, the act and
its legislative history are devoid of any reference to this potential
problem."15
D.

1987-1988: The Development and Enactment of
New Section 7852(d)

As discussed, the 1986 Act did not fully address its interaction
with U.S. treaty obligations. As a result, a more comprehensive legislative discussion of the act's relationship with treaty obligations was
warranted. Previously unaddressed treaty conflicts had been brought
to light by public comment."1 6 Also, the insertion of a "residual override
provision," which would resolve all otherwise unmentioned conflicts
between the 1986 Act and treaties in favor of the act, was discussed
on Capital Hill.
Both of these issues were addressed in June, 1987, by the first
proposed technical corrections bill to the 1986 Act, the Technical Corrections Act of 1987.117 That bill listed specific amendments made by
the 1986 Act that were not to apply in cases where they were inconsistent with treaty provisions,"18 and other amendments that were to

112. 1986 Act Conference Report, supra note 109, at 11-608. The act also did not specify
how this interim rule would interact with existing treaty obligations. Forry & Karlin, supra
note 101, at 795.
113. See 1986 Act, supra note 96, § 1201.
114. Supra note 105 and accompanying text.
115. As Forry & Karlin point out, there were "34 pages of the Conference Report devoted
to the FTC rule changes," yet none of them discussed the changes' effect on tax treaty obligations.
Forray & Karlin, supra note 101, at 795.
116. TCA 1988 Blue Book, supra note 69, at 324.
117. See H.R. 2636, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (available on U.S. Government Printing
Office microfiche).
118. Id. § 112 (y)(3 ).
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apply notwithstanding contrary treaty obligations. 119 In the case of
any unmentioned conflicts between the tax reform act and U.S. treaty
obligations, the bill provided that the act would prevail.120
This proposed enactment of the residual treaty override provision
engendered strong public opposition, from a full spectrum of sources.
U.S. business interest, bar associations, and practicing attorneys, as
well as foreign trade associations, governments, and the Department
of Treasury all spoke out against the pending provision. Even the
Wall Street Journal saw fit to comment, calling the override provision
"a potential fiasco:"
[A] Congressional override . . . would be a devastating
blow. It would wipe out by fiat gains foreign investors in
the U.S. had every right to anticipate when they made their
American investments. It would invite counterlegislation in
foreign countries. It would undermine seriously the credibility of the State Department, which negotiates treaties, and
the Senate, which after all has approved all treaties in

force. 121
The interests of U.S. multinational corporations were represented
by a coalition, "Treaty Integrity Effort," formed specifically to lobby
against the proposal.- = In announcing the formation of the coalition,
the National Foreign Trade Council explained that U.S. business interests were concerned that a residual treaty override provision "would
impair U.S. relations with our major trading partners... and seriously

119.
120.

2
2
Id. § 11 (y)( ).
The proposed residual override provision stated:

(2) CERTAIN AMENDMENTS TO APPLY NOTWITHSTANDING TREATIES - The
following amendments made by the Reform Act shall apply notwithstanding any
treaty obligation of the United States in effect on the date of the enactment of
the Reform Act: ...
(C) Except as provided in the Reform Act or in paragraph (3) of this subsection,
any other amendment made by the Reform Act.
Id. § 112 (y)( 2 ). The bill also proposed changes to § 7852(d), which, in its then-present form,
stated a priority in favor of treaty obligations "in effect on the date of enactment of this title,"
to make clear that that statement refers to the enactment of the 1954 Code, not the 1986 Code.
Id. § 112(y)(1).
121. Wall St. J., July 24, 1987, at 16, col. 1.
122. Matthews, Chapoton Reiterates Administration Concerns Over Tech Correction Bill's
Treaty Override Provisions, 39 TAx NOTES 295 (Apr. 18, 1988); NationalForeign Trade Council
Press Release, Tax Notes Microfiche Database Doc. 88-3160 (Mar. 30, 1988) [hereinafter NFTC
Press Release].
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harm U.S. companies and the international competitiveness of the
U.S. economy as a whole."' 123
Domestic bar associations voiced concern also. The Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association reflected that a residual override
provision was an overbroad solution to an issue that is too important
and too laden with repercussions to be addressed in such a manner:
Underlying our comments is a concern that overriding
treaties should be a last resort, rather than a unilateral
choice by Congressional tax writers. We subscribe to the
views set forth by numerous commentators that unilateral
treaty overrides are undesirable because they undermine the
United States' credibility as a negotiating partner and because there are other alternatives which ought to be tried
first . . . . We would like to stress that damage to our
credibility can be done even where the override is superfluous or of negligible effect. In such circumstances, override
is a gratuitous renunciation of our commitment to international law with no benefit to the revenue.' 3
Comments from other bar association committees and practicing attorneys echoed the ABA Tax Section's concerns.'23
The proposed provision also engendered a strong reaction from our
treaty partners and their citizens. As a representative of the Australian Bankers' Association warned: "ITIhe proposed treaty override will
cause the United States to be regarded as an unreliable treaty partner.
This perception of the United States is likely to work to the detriment
of the U.S. corporations that depend on the commitments of U.S.
treaty partners in conducting their business overseas." 2 6 A memorandum to a letter signed by 13 major U.S. trading partners, sent to
members of Congress, was equally ominous:

123. NFTC Press Release, supra note 122.
124. Letter from members of the Committee on U.S. Activities of Foreigners and Tax
Treaties of the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association to Assistant Treasury
Secretary 0. Donaldson Chapoton, on LEXIS 88 TNT 146-39 (July 15, 1988) (pagination not
given) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter ABA Letter].
125. See, e.g., Committee on U.S. Activities of Foreign Taxpayers and Foreign Activities
of U.S. Taxpayers of the New York State Bar Association Section of Taxation, Legislative
Overrides of Tax Treaties, 37 TAx NOTES 931 (Nov. 30, 1987); Letter from H. David Rosenbloom
to Robert J. Leonard, Chief Counsel for the House Committee on Ways and Means, on LEXIS
87 TNT 144-44 (July 6, 1987).
126. Letter from D.J. Blyth, senior advisor of the Australian Bankers'
Association to J.
Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Tax Notes Microfiche DatabaseDoc. 87-5086
(July 24, 1987).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol5/iss1/1

20

AND
THE IRCLaws and New Section 78
OBLIGATIONS
TREATY
Halpern: United States
Treaty
Obligations,
Revenue

The careful equilibrium reached in treaty negotiations is
vulnerable to measures designed unilaterally to improve upon
the outcome of such negotiations. Sweeping measures such
as a residual override clause undermine the basis of trust
existing between the treaty partners, pose the question of
why double tax conventions should be entered into at all if
later they can be altered at will by the other contracting
party, and may ultimately frustrate future or ongoing activities to enhance existing treaties.127
The Treasury Department also opposed the pending provision, as
it had opposed the treaty override provisions which had been included
in draft versions of the 1986 Act.128 In testimony before Senate Finance
subcommittees conducting hearings on the technical corrections bill,
a representative of the Treasury called the residual override proposal
"a more flagrant disregard of our treaty obligations than any tax
provision previously enacted,"129 warning that, if enacted,130"[i]t would
significantly hurt our relationships with other countries."
Despite this chorus of portentous opposition to the treaty override
provision, it continued to appear in drafts of the technical corrections
act,131 including the final House version of the bill. 13 2 As the House
report explains that body's reasoning:
Notwithstanding Congress' intent that the Act and income
tax treaties be construed harmoniously to the extent possible, conflicts other than those addressed in this bill or in the
Act ultimately may be found or alleged to exist. Therefore,
to prevent any uncertainty and to prevent assertion of treaty
claims whose merit is not now known, the bill provides that
except as otherwise provided by the bill or the Act, the

127. Memorandum to a letter signed by representatives of 13 foreign governments to
Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 39 TAX NOTES 523 (Apr.
20, 1988).
128. See, e.g., Letter from Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III to Senate Finance
Committee Chairman Bob Packwood, 31 TAX NOTES 304 (Apr. 7, 1986).
129. Thorndike, Treasury Opposes Technical Correction on Treaty Overrides, Suggests
Exception to Taxable Year Conformity Rules, 36 TAx NOTES 354 (July 27, 1987).
130. Rosenthal, Treasury Opposes Proposed Limits on Dividends Received Deduction and
Completed Contract Method, 40 TAX NOTES 225, 227 (July 18, 1988).
131. The residual override provision was reproduced (in the same form as contained in the
Technical Corrections Act of 1987, supra note 120, § 112(aa)(2)(C) of both the House and Senate
versions of the Technical Corrections Act of 1988, H.R. 4333, S. 2238, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(both bills available on U.S. Government Printing Office microfiche).
132. H.R. 4333, supra note 131, § 1012(aa)(2)(C).
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provisions of the 1986 Act will apply notwithstanding any
treaty provision in effect on the date of enactment of the
1986 Act (October 22, 1986). In adopting this rule, the committee intends to codify the judicially recognized doctrine
regarding the superiority of the latest expression of the
sovereign will, as it believes that doctrine would apply to
the 1986 Act. 133
Those opposing the residual override provision were more successful when the bill moved to the Senate. The Senate version of the bill
removed the residual override provision from the Act, and replaced
it with the following addition to section 7852(d) of the Code: "Treaty
Obligations - (1) In General - For purposes of determining the
relationship between a provision of a treaty and any law of the United
States affecting revenue, neither the treaty nor the law shall have
preferential status by reason of its being a treaty or law. ' 134 The
Senate bill also proposed the imposition of a disclosure requirement
on taxpayers who take a position on their returns that the application
of a later-enacted Code section is overruled or modified by a pre-existing treaty obligation. 55 This provision was intended to help implement
proposed section 7852(d)(1), by "bringing . . . to light expeditiously
and apprising the IRS in a timely manner" of return positions contrary
136
to that subsection's codification of the later-in-time rule.
The conference agreement substantially adopted the Senate's
changes, with some slight modifications. 137 As a result, the residual
override provision was not included in the final version of TAMRA,
but was replaced by the Senate's addition of new section 7852(d)(1)

133. House TAMRA Report, supra note 49, at 4135.
134. S. 2238, supra note 131, § 1012(aa)(1).
135. Id. at § 1012(aa)(5). This provision, as modified by the conference agreement (see infra
note 137) was codified by TAMRA as § 6114 of the Code. I.R.C. § 6114 (1988). A provision
providing a penalty for failure to comply with this reporting requirement was concurrently
proposed, and eventually enacted by TAMRA, (also with some minor modification, see infra
note 137) as § 6712 of the Code. Id. § 6712.
136. See S. REP. No. 100-445, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 322, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4515, 5833 [hereinafter Senate TAMRA Report].
137. The disclosure requirement was rewritten to require disclosure of any return position
which asserted the predominance of a treaty benefit over a Code provision, expanding the
Senate's language which had required disclosure only when the treaty relied upon predated the
applicable Code section; the fines for noncompliance with this disclosure requirement were
increased as well. Section 894(a) was also rewritten, to complement and cross reference to new
§ 7852(d)(1). TAMRA Conference Report, supra note 2, at 11-12.
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to the Code.' The conference report articulates the conference committee's understanding of its resolution of this issue:
[T]he agreement's provision adds no operative rules to
be applied in determining the relationship of the Code (or
other tax law) and a treaty, but rather states the constitutional principle that such determinations are relevant in determining tax liabilities. Where the relationship of treaties
and statutes must be determined, the agreement simply provides for giving the treaty that regard which it is due under
the ordinary rules of interpreting the interactions of statutes
and treaties.' 9
The replacement of the House's residual override provision with
the Senate's codification of the later-in-time rule was applauded by
those who had lobbied against the override provision. 40 Some commentators, however, questioned whether the Senate modification of the
Code will be any different in effect than enactment of the residual
override provision would have been. 141 This issue is examined below.
V.

ANALYSIS

A. Judicial Doctrines Revisited
Underlying the controversy surrounding the treaty override provisions of the proposed technical corrections bills to the 1986 Act was
a debate as to what the applicable law was, in the absence of any
statutory pronouncement as to the residual interaction of the act and

preexisting treaty provisions. As the above-excerpted portion of the
House report discussing its proposed version of TAMRA reveals, the
House believed that its residual override provision was merely a restatement of the applicable, judicially developed law in the area, that
would apply to overlaps between the Code and treaty provisions re-

138. Also enacted as part of TAMRA were the other statements regarding the coordination
of the 1986 Act with treaty obligations which had been included in its earlier drafts: a list of
amendments to the Code made by the 1986 Act which were to apply notwithstanding contrary
treaty obligations; other provisions which were not to apply to the extent inconsistent with
treaties; and a rewrite of the part of § 7852(d) which addresses the interaction of the 1954 Code
and treaty obligations existing at the time of its enactment, to ensure that the predominance
it created would not be disturbed, and also to ensure that it would not be misconstrued as
applying to the enactment of the 1986 Code. TAMRA, supra note 1, at § 1012(aa)(1)-(4).
139. TAMRA Conference Report, supra note 2, at 12.
140. Matthews, Treasury Encouraged by Finance Treaty Override Substitute, 40 TAx
NoTEs 661-62 (Aug. 15, 1988).
141. Id.
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gardless of its inclusion in the technical corrections bill. 42 This opinion
was not, however, universally shared. For example, in Revenue Ruling
80-223, the Internal Revenue Service took the position that, for a
treaty provision to be overridden by a subsequent statute, an explicit
override must be stated in the statute itself or in its legislative history. 14 Under this analysis, absent a residual override provision regarding the 1986 Act, all unmentioned conflicts between the act and
treaties would be resolved in favor of the treaty obligations. Opponents
of the residual override provision thus argued that the House provision
carried with it a drastic substantive change to current law. The change
created a "blind later-in-time rule," which would resolve any unaddressed conflicts between the act and pre-existing treaty obligations in
favor of the act, regardless of any lack of an explicit statutory intent
to do so (other than the override provision itself).'The Senate Finance Committee was apparently aware of this underlying debate when it drafted its report proposing the enactment of
section 7852(d)(1) in place of the House's residual override provision,
as it included therein an extensive discussion of the applicable law in
the area.14 Like the House, the Senate claimed that its provision was
simply a restatement of established judicial doctrine. - The discussion
of the applicable law which followed steered a middle course between
the position adopted in Revenue Ruling 80-223 and a blind later in-time
rule, refuting the excessiveness of each. The rationale of Revenue
Ruling 80-223 was explicitly rejected, as the report states:
[T]he committee finds it disturbing that some assert that a
treaty prevails over later enacted conflicting legislation in
the absence of an explicit statement of congressional intent
to override the treaty; that it is treaties, not legislation,
which will prevail in the event of a conflict absent an explicit
and specific legislative override. The committee does not
believe this view has any foundation in present law.147
Also rejected was the residual override provision, as the committee
was "concerned that the introduced bill would have changed the rules
1
by which the United States adheres to its international agreements." 48

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
Rev. Rul. 80-223, 1980-2 C.B. 217.
Matthews, supra note 140, at 664.
Senate TAMRA Report, supra note 136, at 316-29.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 325.
Id. at 327.
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The committee stated that unintended conflicts should not override
it opined they might have under the residual
treaty obligations, 4as
9
override provision.1

It thus appears that the Senate modification was indeed substantive, as it reserved the application of the later-in-time rule for intended
conflicts between statutes and treaties, preserving treaty obligations
which might otherwise have been unwittingly overruled. This was a
positive development, because it made the law a bit more precise and,
as a result, easier to rely upon and administer. Had the residual
override provision been enacted, treaty-based return positions would
have been rendered permanently suspect, as an expanded definition
of a "conflict" might have spurned bottomless litigation. The conference
agreement to adopt the Senate's approach to this problem was thus
a sound decision. However, the underlying causes that initially gave
rise to the problem, and that have made it an issue since the United
States entered into its first tax treaty in 1932, still remain.
B.

Underlying Causality

The basic causes underlying the United States' fifty-year effort to
harmonize its tax treaties and tax statutes can be found in the Constitution. The equal weight accorded treaties and federal statutes creates
the capacity for treaty overrides; the fact that those charged with
negotiating tax treaties are different than those responsible for drafting tax legislation increases the likelihood that this capacity will be
utilized.
We are thus faced with two structural causes indigenous to the
U.S. system of government. The effect of the Supremacy Clause is
not likely to be changed.- We can, however, improve the coordination
between the tax legislative and tax treaty processes.
This is, of course, not a novel suggestion,1 5 , and it has sometimes
been acted upon in the past. For example, in considering the ratification of certain tax treaties prior to the 1986 Act, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee solicited the opinions of the Senate and House
tax writing committees about the treaties, in light of pending tax
reform proposals. 15 2 Similarly, when the Foreign Relations Committee

149. Id. Implicit in the Senate TAMRA Report is the assumption that the House's residual
override provision was an adoption of a blind later-in-time rule.
150. See supra note 20.
151. See Rosenbloom, supra note 31, at 31-6.
152. See Letter from Senate Finance Committee Chairman Bob Packwood and Ranking
Minority Member Russell B. Long to Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Richard Lugar, 29
TAX NOTES 676 (Nov. 1, 1985); Letter from House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan
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was considering a recent treaty with Bermuda, House Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski submitted a letter in opposition to that treaty, on the grounds that it was contrary to the spirit
of the soon to be enacted tax reform act. 15
The problem, however, is that this type of cooperation is
haphazard. In the first example above, the tax writers' input was
requested. Representative Rostenkowski's comments on the Bermuda
treaty were not. In fact, the Chairman's letter was submitted amidst
complaints by him that the treaty represented a breach by the administration of its promise to involve the tax writers in the tax treaty
process. '- A more institutionalized, comprehensive effort to insure
such involvement is clearly required.
The debate surrounding the proposed residual override provision
of TAMRA focused attention on this problem. Groups such as Treaty
Integrity Effort not only lobbied against the override provision, but
also tried to help develop procedures that would preclude the need
for overrides in the future, by coordinating legislative and treaty efforts. 155 In response to these suggestions, Treasury officials stated
that they were willing to consider an increased role for the tax committees in the treaty negotiation process.- 5
Statements such as these must be further investigated and their
application scrutinized. Unilaterally overriding a treaty obligation is
a very serious act. It is a violation of established canons of international
law 15 7 and an act which can damage our international credibility and
evoke reprisals. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected
and interdependent, international cooperation only will become more
important. A strong and respected United States treaty program is
crucial, not only to the fair and efficient administration of a tax system,
but to world security interests as well.

Rostenkowski and Ranking Republican John J. Duncan to Senate Foreign Relations Chairman
Richard Lugar, 29 TAX NOTES 789 (Nov. 13, 1985) (responses to Foreign Relations Committee
request).
153. Letter from House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski to Senate
Foreign Relations Chairman Richard Lugar, 33 TAx NOTES 108 (Sept. 22, 1986).
154. Kracov, New U.S.-Bermuda Pact Raises Questions About U.S. Tax Treaty Policy,
32 TAx NOTES 302 (July 28, 1986).
155. Matthews, supra note 122, at 295.
156. Id. at 295-96.
157. As the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Laws of the United States makes
clear: "That a rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement is superseded
as domestic law does not relieve the United States of its international obligation or of the
consequences of a violation of that obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115(1)(b) (1986).
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The question of the proper interaction between tax treaties and
U.S. revenue laws has been at issue ever since the United States
entered into its first tax treaty in the 1930s. As the domestic tax
system has expanded, tax writers have become increasingly willing
to unilaterally override international treaty obligations. Underlying
this activism has been a feeling that the treaty process should not be
able to supplant basic congressional tax policy.', A strong program
of coordination between the tax treaty and tax legislative processes
would go a long way toward resolving this argument, by increasing
the involvement in the treaty process of those who formulate U.S.
tax policy. As a result, tax treaties would more closely reflect congressional tax policy, thereby alleviating the need for treaty overrides.
It is, of course, unrealistic to think that such coordination would
eliminate all tensions in this area, especially in light of current treaty
obligations to which congressional tax writers did not fully contribute.'59 With regard to these obligations, as well as other situations
where overrides of treaty obligations are considered, the comments
of the ABA Tax Section must be recalled: unilateral override should
be considered only as a last resort.w The stakes are too high, and
the potential repercussions too great, for an override to be entered
into without careful consideration, and exhaustion of all other available
alternatives. 161

Despite this clear language, and despite the reference to "consequences" arising out of a
violation of an international obligation, there is, in fact, little opportunity for recourse available
to a party aggrieved by a U.S. treaty override. Because the claim arises under international
law, and not U.S. domestic law, U.S. courts will not grant any relief. See, e.g. Diggs v. Shultz,
470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973). "Under our constitutional
scheme, Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit to do so, and there is nothing the other
branches of government can do about it." Id. at 466. Although there are international bodies
which would hear such a claim, the consensual nature of the international legal process makes
relief from these bodies unlikely as well. See Doernberg, supra note 32, at 202-07. As a result,
the only remedy practically available to redress a treaty override is unilateral retaliatory measures by the treaty partner, a remedy states are very hesitant to pursue. Id. at 206.
158. Matthews, Treaty Overrides: The View From Congress, 39 TAx NOTES 422, 423 (Apr.
25, 1988).
159. As of Mar. 31, 1989, the United States was party to 38 income tax treaties and 18
estate and/or gift tax treaties. Fogarasi, Gordon, Venuti & Renfroe, Current Status of U.S.
Tax Treaties, 18 TAx MGmT. INT'L J. 233 (1989).
160. See text quoted at supra note 124.
161. As the ABA Letter points out, "renegotiation of tax treaties, revisions to the U.S.
Model Treaty, interpretations of general or unclear provisions of treaties with prior input from
the tax authorities of our treaty partners, and, at the very least, the use of grace periods" are
all alternatives to the unilateral override of a treaty obligation. ABA Letter, supra note 124.
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